# StratoFusion Security Audit Report

- Date: 2026-03-31T22:34:32.602Z.
- Scope: Next.js application, Fly.io rclone service, Neon/PostgreSQL access patterns.

## Executive Summary

- Fixed now: 2 critical, 2 high, 2 medium.
- Remaining open findings: 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
- Audit methodology: repo-aware static analysis, targeted auth/ownership fixes, and focused test verification.

## Fixed Findings

### Critical

- Fly rclone service previously trusted callers without server-side authentication.
  Affected: fly-rclone/server.js, fly-rclone/src/middleware/auth.js
  Why it matters: Any network-reachable caller could hit operational rclone endpoints if they could reach the service, regardless of the client’s bearer-token support.
  Fix status: Fixed now. The service now enforces requireServiceAuth globally, accepts Bearer and X-API-Key headers, and compares keys with crypto.timingSafeEqual.

- Batch copy accepted caller-supplied userId on a publicly matched route.
  Affected: src/app/api/rclone/batch-copy/route.ts
  Why it matters: A crafted request could impersonate another user when resolving tokens or recording operation ownership.
  Fix status: Fixed now. The route now requires Clerk auth and rejects any requestUserId that does not match the authenticated user.

### High

- Operation status and cancellation endpoints were missing user ownership enforcement.
  Affected: src/app/api/rclone/operations/route.ts, src/app/api/rclone/operations/[id]/route.ts, src/app/api/ops/route.ts, src/lib/database/operations.ts
  Why it matters: Authenticated users could poll or interfere with operations they did not own by guessing operation IDs.
  Fix status: Fixed now. Routes now require auth and use persisted user-scoped helpers before returning operation details or snapshots.

- Operational logs included token prefixes in several flows.
  Affected: src/app/api/auth/refresh/route.ts, src/lib/session-server.ts, src/lib/rclone/core/flyio-client.ts, src/lib/rclone/core/config-templates.ts
  Why it matters: Even partial token material increases blast radius in log sinks and during incident review.
  Fix status: Fixed now. The updated logging paths record token presence and length only, not token prefixes.

### Medium

- Database bootstrap relied on driver defaults for remote transport security.
  Affected: src/lib/database/client.ts, src/lib/database/__tests__/client.test.ts
  Why it matters: A remote connection string without explicit TLS settings left security posture dependent on environment defaults rather than code-level enforcement.
  Fix status: Fixed now. Remote DATABASE_URL values are now normalized to require sslmode=require, while localhost and placeholder URLs keep the existing build-safe behavior.

- Token debug surfaces were available to any authenticated user.
  Affected: src/app/api/debug/tokens/route.ts, src/app/dev/tokens/page.tsx, src/app/dev/tokens/TokenDebugDashboard.tsx
  Why it matters: Even redacted token metadata should stay within developer-only tooling to avoid unnecessary production exposure.
  Fix status: Fixed now. The debug API now returns 403 for non-dev users, and the /dev/tokens page redirects non-dev users before rendering the dashboard.

## Open Findings

## Audit Notes

### Audit 01: Token Encryption

- DATABASE_URL not set; skipped live database token verification.

### Audit 02: API Authentication and Authorization

- The app middleware keeps broad public API matchers for provider and rclone routes, so route-level auth remains critical.

### Audit 03: Input Validation and Command Construction

- No eval usage, shell:true child processes, or unsanitized path joins were detected.
- The existing JSON-LD dangerouslySetInnerHTML usage is allowlisted as static JSON.stringify output.

### Audit 04: Secrets and Logging

- Logger scan is heuristic and focuses on obvious token-prefix exposure and hard-coded secret patterns.
- Direct env-var response detection was intentionally left out after it produced low-signal false positives in repo helpers.

### Audit 05: Fly rclone Service

- Auth middleware currently allows only health/docs/streaming endpoints to bypass service authentication.

### Audit 06: Database Security

- DATABASE_URL not set; skipped live database scoping checks.

## Tests Executed

- `pnpm.cmd exec vitest run src/lib/database/__tests__/client.test.ts`.
  PASS: 1 file, 5 tests passed.
- `pnpm.cmd exec vitest run src/app/api/debug/tokens/__tests__/route.test.ts src/app/api/rclone/health/__tests__/route.test.ts src/app/api/rclone/move/__tests__/route.test.ts src/app/api/rclone/batch-copy/__tests__/route.test.ts src/app/api/rclone/operations/__tests__/route.test.ts src/app/api/rclone/operations/[id]/__tests__/route.test.ts src/app/api/ops/__tests__/route.test.ts`.
  PASS: 7 files, 26 tests passed.
- `cd fly-rclone && pnpm.cmd exec jest src/middleware/__tests__/auth.test.js --runInBand --coverage=false`.
  PASS: 1 file, 5 tests passed.

## Commands Run

- `pnpm.cmd exec tsx scripts/security-audit/01-token-encryption.ts`.
- `pnpm.cmd exec tsx scripts/security-audit/02-api-authz-scan.ts`.
- `pnpm.cmd exec tsx scripts/security-audit/03-input-validation-scan.ts`.
- `pnpm.cmd exec tsx scripts/security-audit/04-secrets-and-logging-scan.ts`.
- `pnpm.cmd exec tsx scripts/security-audit/05-fly-rclone-scan.ts`.
- `pnpm.cmd exec tsx scripts/security-audit/06-db-security-check.ts`.
- `pnpm.cmd exec tsx scripts/security-audit/generate-report.ts`.

## Remaining Risks and Follow-up

- Add Fly request rate limiting if the service exposure expands beyond tightly controlled server-to-server traffic.